


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR-Iran: Following Khrushchev's threats against NATO bases in Greece and Italy and the Soviet release of "CENTO documents" allegedly revealing plans for nuclear war against the USSR, Moscow has warned Iran that if it remains allied with the West, it faces nuclear destruction in any East-West conflict. In an interview with Iranian Prime Minister Amini on 8 September, Soviet Ambassador Pegov indirectly threatened strong Soviet action unless Iran withdrew from CENTO. Other Soviet diplomats in Iran have reportedly stated that the USSR will invoke the 1921 Treaty of Friendship--which Moscow claims grants the USSR the right to occupy Iran if Soviet security is threatened--in order to forestall CENTO aggression. Moscow probably believes that the Shah's regime is particularly vulnerable to this kind of intimidation and that the general increase in East-West tensions provides a favorable opportunity for an attempt to weaken the pro-Western government in Tehran. []

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*Afghanistan-Pakistan: Afghan Foreign Minister Naim has told Ambassador Byroade that the Afghan Government has decided to close its borders to shipments coming through Pakistan, despite Pakistani assurances that transit trade could continue. Naim indicated that Kabul would reconsider this decision only if Pakistan allowed the reopening of Afghan consulates and trade offices in Pakistan. Under questioning from Byroade, Naim admitted that if Afghanistan persisted in this course of action, it would no longer be able to balance its relations with the bloc and with non-Communist countries. Naim implied that []

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Afghanistan was resigned to the loss of major American aid projects, which depend on the transit route through Pakistan.

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Such a basic change in Afghan policy would make the Kabul regime almost entirely dependent on the USSR for continuation of its development programs. Although the Afghans now seem ready to do this rather than make an appeal to Pakistan, they may merely be calculating that a strong display of determination will persuade the US to put the pressure they feel is required on Pakistan.

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Dominican Republic: Despite President Balaguer's commitment to a program of democratization and national conciliation, the lines of conflict continue to be sharply drawn between the government's official political machine and responsible elements of the opposition. Opposition leaders maintain that the regime is incapable of changing its basic character as proved by the continued repression and killings of dissidents in the interior. They warn that US support for even a partial lifting of OAS sanctions against the regime would embitter the majority of Dominicans against the US.

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The OAS subcommittee, which arrives in the Dominican Republic today to ascertain whether present conditions warrant the removal of the sanctions, will encounter demonstrations designed to show the wide public support for opposition views. Some oppositionists may attempt to provoke police reprisals to demonstrate the lack of political freedom in the country.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet Threats Against CENTO Members

As part of current Soviet intimidation tactics to heighten world tension against the backdrop of the Berlin crisis, the USSR is intensifying pressure on CENTO member countries. The "CENTO documents" were exhibited at a Moscow press conference on 18 August, and a TASS declaration published the following day stressed the inevitability of atomic attacks on Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in any conflict between a CENTO nation and the USSR. Moscow said that CENTO plans for "creating zones of nuclear destruction" by atomic explosions around the territory of the Soviet Union hold important implications for members of NATO and SEATO as well and warned that no "atomic shield" can protect aggressors against the USSR.

The USSR displayed photostat copies of the documents at the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul on 8 September, despite objections from the Turkish Foreign Office.

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Pegov's threat to the Iranian prime minister was repeated in stronger terms by other Soviet officials who advised Iran "not to take lightly" the USSR's concern over Western military preparations. They stated that unless Iran leaves CENTO, the Soviets will occupy Iran to eliminate the threat, and that the US, which will "not fight for Berlin, would certainly not intervene here."

Iran regards as void articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship which provided that the USSR could move troops into Iran in the event that bases for operations against the USSR were being established on Iranian territory. Tehran has maintained that these articles applied only at the time and only to Russian emigrés.

Although the Shah is under pressure from Iranian neutralists to loosen his ties with his Western allies, he seems determined to stand up to current Soviet threats.

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The Situation in the Dominican Republic

The government's political machine, the Dominican party (PD), evidently hopes at a convention later this month to name Joaquin Balaguer its candidate for president in the elections scheduled for next May. Balaguer, generally regarded as a man of high personal integrity, has been distrusted by many oppositionists for having been a puppet of the late dictator, though some oppositionists have recently begun to support him because of his liberalization program.

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Whether Balaguer will accept the nomination is unknown, but he has made it clear that, in his opinion, the next government should be a coalition and has publicly condemned "reactionaries" in the party and in the government. The Dominican party, the personal political vehicle of the late dictator for 31 years, is thoroughly discredited among the literate Dominican public, and recent party rallies have clearly been staged affairs which have prompted no spontaneity or enthusiasm from the paid participants. Though the party can still count on the votes of large numbers of illiterate and semi-literate rural workers--possibly even enough to provide a majority of the electorate--concern for its deteriorating position might be sufficient to cause party leaders to make the compromises necessary for securing Balaguer's candidacy. On the other hand, Balaguer will probably weigh carefully the adverse effects on his own reputation of being more closely identified with the discredited Dominican party. He has [] stated that he feels personally close to the opposition National Civic Union, but that his present role prohibits him from identifying himself with it.

Balaguer, who stated early last July that leaders of the pro-Castro Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) would soon be deported, confidentially disclosed to the American consul late last month that "the military" had blocked the deportations for "tactical" reasons. In recent weeks, the MPD has opened a new headquarters and begun publishing a newspaper, while the killings and other police reprisals against the opposition have been limited to action against moderate groups, especially []

the widely supported National Civic Union (UCN). Dr. Viriato Fiallo, president of the UCN, told the American consul on 7 September that MPD leaders had received financial assistance from General Ramfis Trujillo with the understanding that they would attack the UCN for having "sold out to Yankee imperialism." The MPD did, in fact, launch such attacks during the last week in August. The MPD attacks were quickly repeated by the government's press and radio outlets.

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It was in the context of a 7 September discussion of the MPD leaders that Luis Mercado, president of the Dominican party, warned the consul that, as "politics is a two-way street," failure of the US to support the Dominican Government "would have to be taken into account" in determining the government's policies. He said flatly that the US should know that the government has no intention of turning power over to the UCN.

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